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Canadian Merger Policy and Its
International Implications
ERIC K. GRESSMAN
The implications of Canadian merger policy are of deep
concern to U.S. and other foreign investors who have invested or are con-
sidering investing in Canada. U.S. interests own 60 percent of Canada's
manufacturing industry.' In 1978, approximately 250 mergers in Canada
involved a foreign-owned or foreign-controlled buyer (usually U.S.). 2 There-
fore, it is not surprising that Canada's merger policy is no less important to
the decisions of foreign investors in Canada than the Justice Department's
policies are to domestic investors in the United States. At the same time, the
Canadian government and public are concerned with their merger policy as a
means of regulating foreign acquisitions that affect the economic well-being
of Canada.
Canadian merger policy is also important to explain the past and future
trends of U.S. investment in Canadian industries, the effects of foreign in-
vestment in Canada, and the response of Canadian authorities to transna-
tional corporate concentration within their economy.
This article is divided into four sections: (1) the pre-1970 history of
Canadian merger policy, (2) the development of Canadian merger policy
during the 1970s, (3) the international ramifications of early and recent
Canadian merger policy, and (4) the future changes in Canadian merger
policy and their probable effects.
THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN MERGER POLICY: 1889-1969
Canadian Anti-merger Legislation
Despite the importance of policies generated by the Crown and the courts, a
study of Canadian merger policy must begin with an examination of Can-
ada's antitrust statutes. The statutory language prescribes the limits within
which Canadian judges and prosecutors can act. In contrast to the U.S.
experience, 3 the impetus for the original antitrust legislation in Canada
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came from small businessmen rather than from the general populace. In the
late nineteenth century, Conservatives felt pressure from powerful agricul-
tural interests that were angry over the rising prices of farm implements,
which they viewed as a result of the domination of the farm implement
industry by a few combines. In response, the Conservatives attempted to
show their concern about the inflationary economic conditions brought on by
combines. 4 Acting without government support, Clarke Wallace, a Conserva-
tive member of Parliament, proposed the creation of a Select Committee to
examine the practices of combines. Parliament agreed to the proposal and
appointed Wallace to head the "Committee to Investigate and Report upon
Alleged Combines in Manufacturers, Trade and Insurance" (the Committee).
The Committee found that the evils caused by combines justified some form
of legislation,5 but only mildly condemned the actual combines investigated.
The Committee demonstrated more concern over nonmembers of combines
than in protecting consumers.6 Subsequently, Wallace introduced a bill
which met opposition from powerful business interests.7 When the Senate
received the bill for approval, it weakened its provisions by inserting the
condition that competition be "unduly" limited and prices be "unreasonably"
raised.' Though Wallace and his followers opposed these changes, they de-
cided that a compromise bill was better than none at all, and although the
statute did not specifically mention mergers, it did set the tone for all future
merger legislation during this period. Perhaps the provision of S.C. 1889
relating to sanctions is most significant. The 1889 Act provided only for
criminal penalties, in part because legislators felt civil penalties might be
unconstitutional. 9 Criminal sanctions remain at the core of Canadian anti-
trust law.
The deterrent value of the legislation's misdemeanor sanctions is incon-
siderable when compared to the treble damage sanction found in U.S. anti-
trust laws. Moreover, Canadian criminal law's burden of proof further de-
pletes the government's arsenal against anticompetitive practices. The
Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated the
statute. This burden favors the defendant far more than the preponderance
of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases.
In addition to the statute's heavy burden of proof, enforcement under the
combines laws must meet the requirements of mens rea and strict construc-
tion. The mens rea standard increases the burden placed upon the Crown
and renders conviction more difficult.' ° Should the combines laws be re-
formed, legislation sufficiently specific to meet the standard of strict con-
struction of criminal statutes must be implemented.
Aside from limiting antitrust actions to criminal prosecutions, the statute
favors alleged violators by requiring proof that defendants have conspired,
combined, agreed or arranged "unlawfully" to restrain trade, limit produc-
tion, and so forth. The 1889 Act thus implies that corporations could engage
in anticompetitive practices lawfully. In this respect, the Canadian statute is
in sharp contrast to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which provides that
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"[elvery combination in the form of trust or otherwise, in restraint of
trade... is... illegal" [emphasis added]. 1 The Sherman Act on its face thus
leaves corporations less -room than the Canadian anticombines act to argue
that their anticompetitive practices are somehow legal.
Finally, the defendant is favored by the requirement that a combination
must "unduly" limit production or lessen competition to be unlawful. The
government must prove substantial detriment to competition. This provision
provides the basis for arguments over the effect of a combination.'
2
During the first decade of the twentieth century a merger boom oc-
curred in Canada, and the public and press began to connect mergers with
the rising cost of living. In response to public agitation over the perceived
economic consequences of mergers, Liberal Prime Minister Laurier and his
assistant, MacKenzie King, proposed legislation with primarily investigative
and publicity provisions. The 1910 Act was the first attempt to establish the
necessary administrative machinery at the federal level to enforce the anti-
combines laws. Although the government attorneys in the provinces had
authority before 1910 to prosecute corporations,' 3 these attorneys placed a
low priority on prosecuting white-collar crime, and none of the companies
responsible for the forty-seven mergers occurring from 1900-1909 were
prosecuted. 4
The statute, known as the Combines Investigation Act of 1910, provided
that if six or more Canadian residents made an application, a judge would
arrange a meeting between the complainants and the defendants. Following
the meeting, the judge could order an investigation, demand more informa-
tion before proceeding, or refuse to investigate. If the judge decided to inves-
tigate, the minister of labor would be informed, and an ad hoc board would
be appointed. If an investigation found the defendants guilty of a violation,'
1
penalties, set at a maximum fine of $1000 a day and restricted to conduct
occurring after the report is filed, were imposed. Moreover, the 1910 Act
relied upon publicity as an official sanction of the government. The investiga-
tion report, upon which a violation would be founded, could also be published
in the Gazette for public dissemination.
Although Parliament included mergers within the definition of com-
bines, King emphasized that the 1910 Act was not an attempt to legislate
against mergers. Aside from more specific language concerning mergers and
the penalty provision, the 1910 Act was similar to that of 1889.16 In retro-
spect, the 1910 Act was ineffective in controlling concentration because
there was no permanent machinery to enforce the board's decisions and
citizens were reluctant to come forward to complain.' 7 Attorneys in the pro-
vinces were similarly ineffective. Of 160 Canadian mergers occuring from
1910 to 1922, none were prosecuted."
In response to the continued high cost of living after World War I,
Parliament passed the Combines and Fair Prices Act as well as the Board of
Commerce Act. In doing so it set up the Board of Commerce (Board), and
gave it investigatory and judicial powers.' 9 In 1921, after the Supreme Court
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of Canada split upon the question of the Board's constitutionality, the Privy
Council declared the statute to be ultra vires, characterizing the Board of




In 1923, MacKenzie King, now prime minister, helped pass the new
Combines Investigation Act (Combines Act). This act essentially continued
the policies of the 1910 legislation, but imposed new penalties and simplified
administrative procedures. Under this legislation the process of forming a
combine became an offense if it "operate[d] to the detriment or against the
interest of the public."2' However, the prime minister and most of Parliament
maintained the view that mergers normally are beneficial to business and
public. 22 By 1934, the newly elected Conservative government could not
ignore pressure for further legislation against corporate combinations. The
Dominion Trade and Industry Act established a commission to administer
the Combines Investigation Act. The Combines Act also permitted the gov-
ernment to control prices and production of all industries, but gave the Com-
mission power to veto such control.'
What may ultimately be the most important amendment to the merger
provisions of the Combines Act, one that has been retained in present Cana-
dian merger law, occurred in 1935.24 Parliament declared a merger to be
illegal where it "... has operated or is likely to operate to the detriment or
against the interest of the public, whether consumers, producers or others."
25
The 1935 amendment created a heavy burden of proof upon the government
and has recently been interpreted as affording a defense to the charge of
illegal merger.26 In 1946, Parliament added an amendment to the Combines
Act that "restored... a provision enabling the commissioner to proceed on
his own initiative with an inquiry to determine whether a combine exists or is
being formed.
27
This series of legislative enactments succeeded in establishing an ad-
ministrative machinery for investigation; however, prior to World War II the
Commission was greatly weakened by the lack of sufficient staff. The com-
missioner never had more than one or two professional assistants and some
clerical staff during the prewar periods. Expenditures were at a maximum of
$62,000 in 1940; however, $38,000 was used for legal fees and only $24,000
to cover the activities of the commissioner.28 From 1923 to 1940, only twenty
reports were made, and only sixteen were published-an average of one per
year.' None of these reports concerned mergers. Only one merging corpora-
tion was prosecuted during this period, and it was not convicted.
30
From 1940 to 1949, thirteen reports were published. Expenditures
reached a high of $169,000 in 1949 of which $65,000 went to legal fees and
$86,000 to salaries.3 1 Of the reports, four concerned distribution of goods, two
covered contractors' activities, and seven reported on combines among man-
ufacturers.32 After the war, a study of international cartels in manufacturing
was published. Large manufacturing firms thus became much more con-
spicuous among those investigated than before World War II.
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The Combines Act was further amended to provide for appointment of
deputy commissioners and to give such commissioners the power to gather
information and produce studies on monopolistic .conditions in Canada.
Other amendments designed to facilitate prosecutions provided that in com-
bines prosecutions, corporations would not have the option of trial by jury.
During the 1940s, the commissioner of the Combines Branch had au-
thority to enter premises, search for documents, subpoena witnesses, and
issue a report with or without government support. Businessmen claimed
that the commissioner acted as detective, prosecutor, judge, and sentencer
by publishing the report.33 The fact remains, however, the commissioner was
hampered by a lack of funds and'staff. No Ph.D. economists were Combines
Branch employees until 1949.
Because of the complaints about inadequate administration of the anti-
combines act, the government appointed the MacQuarrie Committee (Com-
mittee). The Committee recommended division of the functions of the com-
missioner into investigation and research agencies. The Committee also
called for more use of empirical studies. 34 Enacting only some of the Mac-
Quarrie Committee's recommendations, the Parliament in 1952 divided the
Combines Branch into the Director of Investigation and Research and the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (RTPC).
The role of the Commission was to examine evidence presented to it by
the head of the Director of Investigation and Research and by the parties
injured by an alleged violation. The director of the Commission would then
issue a report. Legislators felt that mere publication of this report would
provide a deterrent effect and that the Commission could appraise the effect
of the practices (for example, heavy conglomerate merger activity in a certain
industry) upon the public interest.3 5 In practice, the director's inquiries were
mainly the result of informal complaints or newspaper reports. During the
1950s, the Combines Branch examined 815 complaints and submitted thirty-
one reports to the minister. Unlike the U.S.'s FTC, there was no requirement
that all cases be disposed of by written ruling, and the director and minister
had great discretion in dropping cases.
36
The 1951-52 amendments added the judicial remedy of dissolution to
the merger and monopoly provisions. An order of dissolution could be issued
even without a formal conviction, if the court found that an act constituting
or leading to an offense was likely to occur.37 Despite the detailed procedures
for investigation of combines that was established under the 1950s legislative
enactments, the Commission remained handicapped in several ways. Until
1959 the Commission's permanent staff consisted only of clerical personnel.
Its reports were often ignored by the Canadian press. Until 1957, the Com-
mission sent a summary of published reports to the press, libraries, and both
houses of Parliament. Only five summary reports were published, charging
corporations in various industries with merging and monopolizing illegally.
Though no action was taken by the minister on these charges, the govern-
ment at least signalled businessmen that it now regarded illegal mergers as
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worthy of investigation as price-fixing or resale price maintenance.38 How-
ever, since 1957, the Commission has only released a notice that a report has
been published.
Moreover, under the established procedures, issuance of the report end-
ed the job of the RTPC. The decision whether or not to prosecute a corpora-
tion became a political or policy decision residing with the minister of justice.
After consulting an outside attorney, the minister could decide to prosecute,
normally appointing the lawyer that recommended prosecution to try the
case. However, if the corporation terminated its practice after the minister's
decision to prosecute, the case was usually dropped. The threat of prosecu-
tion thus became an important deterrent to the continued existence of an
anticompetitive merger.
39
The government in 1960 appeased business by enacting legislation which
separated mergers and monopolies from the rest of the Combines Act. The
1960 amendments were perceived as weakening" ... the chances of proceed-
ing against mergers...,40 From 1960 to 1969, nine charges of illegal merger
were leveled at companies of various industries. Some of the investigations
into these mergers were dropped because corporations decided to forego the
merger rather than face prosecution. In 1965, however, the government
issued an order of prohibition against a merger in the weed killer industry.4
In addition, corporations were fined $40,000 in 1966 for a merger in the
chemicals industry, and in 1967 a merger was prohibited in the iron indus-
try.4' Although many commentators accused the government of practicing a
weak policy toward mergers, " the Combines Branch did demonstrate, con-
sidering its limited resources, that prohibition of illegal mergers was a top
priority. During the 1960s, the number of investigations into charges of
merger was greater than the number of price discrimination investigations,
and almost as great as the number of resale price maintenance investiga-
tions. 44 In retrospect, although Canada was one of the first to legislate
against combines, until the 1970s investigation and enforcement under the
statutes have been minimal.
The Policies of the Courts: 1889-1960
In the first eighty years of judicial interpretation, the courts developed impor-
tant statutory and constitutional doctrines applicable to the Combines Act.
These doctrines were to provide the basis for the startling case law develop-
ments concerning mergers during the 1970s.
The British North American (B.N.A.) Act, originally passed by England's
Parliament, established the Canadian constitution and distributed powers
between the federal and provincial governments. Three grants of powers
could conceivably support federal anticombines legislation. The B.N.A. Act
provided the federal government with the general power to "make laws for
the peace, good order and good government of Canada."4 5 In addition, the
power to regulate trade and commerce could provide authority for passage of
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a federal merger law. Finally, the federal government had authority over
criminal law which earlier was used to justify all Canadian merger law. The
primary areas of provincial sovereignty are property, civil rights, and matters
of a local or private nature.
4 6
Since 1889, the courts have consistently upheld the federal combines
law solely on the basis of criminal law powers. In cases as early as 1881 the
courts restricted the general trade and commerce power to international and
interprovincial trade and general trade affecting the entire country.47 Each
time Parliament tried to move away from purely criminal restrictions in the
antitrust field, its actions were nullified by the courts. In 1921 the Privy
Council held in In Re the Board of Commerce Act, 1919 and the Combines
and Fair Prices Act, 191948 that the Board of Commerce Act, which em-
powered a board analogous to the U.S. FTC to investigate the restraint of
monopolies and mergers, fell beyond the constitutional authority of the fed-
eral government.
The Privy Council reiterated its opposition to any development of Cana-
dian administrative remedies to combines violations in 1934, in O'Connor v.
Walden.4 9 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council emphasized that the
Commission at the Combines Branch had no constitutional authority to de-
termine the legal rights of parties involved before it. The Privy Council re-
garded the Commission as a purely administrative tribunal whose reports had
no legal significance. More recently, Justice Judson of Canada's Supreme
Court in Canadian Fishing Co. v. Smith50 emphasized in a dissenting opinion
that the holding of O'Connor was still valid.
Thus, in the constitutional area at least, the courts were a reactionary
force during this early period. Whenever a Canadian court confronted the
prospect of the development of an administrative tribunal similar to the
FTC, it severely limited the tribunal's powers. Legislators did not propose
extension of a private right of action in merger legislation fearing such
amendments would be held unconstitutional .5 Therefore, the legislative en-
actments over this period only added more administrative machinery and
penalties, but did not expand the scope of enforcement.
In the period prior to 1960, the courts increased the Crown's burden of
proof in merger cases beyond that which appeared on the face of the statute.
What emerged from the government's losses in the courts was the unstated
rule that the government had to prove the existence of a virtual monopoly in
order to win a merger case. In Rex v. Canadian Import Company,5 2 the gov-
ernment prosecuted a dealer of coal and coke in Quebec who had acquired all
other such dealers in the area. The court acquitted the defendants of the
charges, finding that the government had not proved sufficient detriment to
competition. In Rex v. Staples,53 the court found that control of 50 percent of
an industry was insufficient to establish control detrimental to the public.
The government's only successful case during this period came in 1953
in Rex v. Eddy Match Co.54 In Eddy Match, the government coupled its
merger charges with charges of monopolization and monopoly. From 1927 to
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1950 Eddy had a monopoly maintained by predatory practices, followed by
acquisition of new entrants. The court held that in a case with such a long
history of monopoly, merger with new entrants was detrimental to the public.
Eddy Match did not lead to rulings favorable to the government in
merger cases involving concentrated industries. In Regina v. Canadian
Breweries Ltd.,55 the Ontario Supreme Court reviewed the legality of a
merger which substantially increased the concentration of the beer industry.
The defendant brewery had gained control of thirty-seven other breweries in
Ontario over a 30-year period. Though the defendant held 61 percent of the
market, while Molson and Labatts together held 34 percent, the court failed
to consider whether or not the high concentration of the industry operated to
the public's detriment. Ruling for the defendant, Chief Justice McRuer noted
that he was bound to favor the defendant in criminal cases because of the
reasonable doubt standard, the circumstantial evidence rule, and the rule
favoring the defendant in the construction of penal statites. Thus, in Cana-
dian Breweries, the court found that a merger which substantially increased
concentration in an already oligopolistic market was not sufficient to convict
a defendant of a criminal combines offense.
5 6
Aside from requiring proof of a virtual monopoly in merger cases, Cana-
dian cases showed signs of changing the meaning of public detriment. Early
decisions analyzed a combines case solely in terms of whether the activity
reduced competition. The courts assumed that a reduction of competition
was prima facie detrimental to the public. As early as 1912 the Canadian
Supreme Court emphasized that an alleged breach of a combines provision
should be analyzed from the point of view of harm to free competition.57 The
Supreme Court, in Container Materials Ltd. v. The King,58 reiterated that the
anticombines provisions were enacted for the specific public interest in free
competition.
The view that Canadian merger law should be analyzed solely from the
perspective of the effect on free competition began to lose some of its force in
1958 when the Supreme Court decided Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd. v.
The Queen.59 In .that case the appellants argued that their admittedly anti-
competitive actions were designed to preserve a dying industry. The majority
held that the public had a right to free competition and appellants would not
be heard to argue that anticompetitive acts promote the public interests.
However, in an important dissent, Justice Cartwright indicated that if the
appellants had proved the alleged benefit to the public, he would have had
some difficulty affirming the conviction.
6 0
Fearing that Justice Cartwright's view would gain majority support in
the Supreme Court, Parliament deleted the portions of the conspiracy provi-
sion of the anticombines statute that required a showing of detriment to the
public. However, Parliament retained the detriment language in the merger
and monopoly provisions.6' This apparent oversight allowed the Supreme
Court in the 1970s to utilize Cartwright's position to destroy much of the
merger provision's force.
62
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CANADIAN MERGER POLICY
Legislative Developments in the 1970s
Both the proposed and enacted statutes of the 1970s concerning Canadian
antitrust law in general, and merger law in particular, were radically different
from those enacted in the previous eight years. From 1889 to 1969, Parlia-
ment's amendments to the anticombines law were only moderate adjust-
ments. 6 On the other hand, the reforms of the 1970s, resulting in the
passage of Foreign Investment Review Act of 1974 (FIRA), constituted fun-
damental changes in the justifications for, and the approach of, the combines
law.
In 1966, responding to the concern of the populace over the increasing
concentration of Canadian industries, the government requested that the
Economic Council (Council) prepare a report on competition policy.64 The
Council's Interim Report on Competition Policy, published in 1969, stated
that the prime purpose of competition law was the promotion of economic
efficiency. The Council felt that some practices, such as price-fixing, market-
sharing, and resale price maintenance, were inimical to the public interest,
and should invariably be prohibited. The Council also believed that mergers
and monopolies should not be dealt with as criminal offenses. The report's
rationale was that criminal law set up too onerous a burden of proof upon a
government attempting to prevent a harmful merger. The report went so far
as to declare that courts were improper forums for deciding whether to pro-
hibit a merger. Instead, the Council recommended the formation of an expert
tribunal. Such a tribunal would allow mergers bringing about cost savings,
but would prohibit mergers increasing the market power of the defendants to
the disadvantage of the consumer. The feeling was that an expert tribunal
could weigh the economic costs and benefits of a merger better than a
criminal court. The Council thus adopted Justice Cartwright's position in
Howard Smith Paper Mills that mergers should not be analyzed solely for
their effect on free competition.65 At the same time, the Council went beyond
the Justice's opinion by conferring jurisdiction upon a quasi-judicial tribunal
to make these economic judgments.
The report's concept of splitting combines cases into criminal and eco-
nomic tribunals according to the nature of the offense became the corner-
stone of the government's proposals to Parliament in the 1970s. Agreeing
with the report, the government perceived the purpose of competition law as
a means of achieving efficiency.66 The government also stood to gain the
political support of small businessmen for any reform that lessened the mar-
ket power of the large foreign and domestic conglomerates.
67
Despite the report's theoretical soundness, the government realized that
it stood on shaky constitutional grounds. To create an expert tribunal to
oversee monopolies and mergers, the federal government of Canada had
two options. It could seek to change the constitution to expand the trade
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and commerce power. However, changing the constitution is always diffi-
cult because provincial authorities, fearful of an assault on their sover-
eignty, are likely to oppose any expansion of federal power. The other option
was to refer the legislation to the Supreme Court to see whether the estab-
lishment of such a tribunal fell within the federal powers specified in the
B.N.A. Act. Some recent cases indicated that the Supreme Court might
uphold the constitutionality of a quasi-judicial tribunal,6" but the possibility
that the Court would reach the opposite result in this instance could not be
disregarded.
In spite of these constitutional problems, the federal government in 1971
sought, without success, passage of a bill that would have adopted the Coun-
cil's recommendations.69 The bill provided that criminal procedures were
applicable only to per se offenses such as price-fixing. It also required regis-
tration with a competitive practices tribunal for all mergers involving gross
assets greater than $5 million or a foreign acquiring firm. The tribunal was
empowered to prohibit or dissolve a merger when it would engender signifi-
cantly less competition.
In evaluating a foreign takeover, the tribunal was instructed to examine
whether the merger was likely to (1) extend the market power of the merged
firm in Canada, (2) extend the influence of an international cartel or oligo-
poly into Canada, or (3) restrict production or exports from Canada.
In the face of intense criticism of the 1971 proposed bill, especially from
large business interests, the government decided to redraft and resubmit it in
two phases. A revised version comprising the first phase became law at the
end of 1975.70
The new legislation abandoned the concept that certain anticompetitive
practices were per se offenses. It further pleased big business by retaining
the language of "undueness" and "unreasonableness" in proscribing trade
restraints. However, the bill stated that an agreement can be undue even if
the parties do not control virtually the entire relevant market.
Two major reforms instituted by the 1975 legislation signalled a commit-
ment to more vigorous enforcement of anticombines laws. The act included
provisions for a private right of action for damages resulting from a violation
of the combines laws, although this was not extended to merger or monopoly
violations. Another fundamental reform was the provision that the breach of
an order issued by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission constituted a
violation of the 1975 Act. Any person injured by the breach was given a
private right of action against the violator.
7 1
Some of the most controversial provisions of the government's legislation
were reserved for the second phase of the legislation. 72 Big business zealously
opposed governmental regulation of mergers, monopolization, and volume
discounts, and, as a result, the second bill was not passed. Whether a new
version of that bill is reintroduced will depend upon political developments.7'
Nevertheless, an examination of the contents of the proposed 1977 legisla-
tion is worthwhile, not only because it ultimately may be enacted, but also
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because it reflects the new attitudes of the government and much of the
Parliament toward changes in the merger laws.
Under the proposed amendments, the Competition Board (Board) is sub-
stituted for the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission. Consisting of five to
seven permanent members, the Board has as its main objective the examina-
tion of trade practices referred to it. The Board can examine mergers and
monopolies as well as trade practices specified in the Stage I amendments.
Mergers and monopolies under the bill are not criminal offenses, but a court
can impose criminal sanctions for violation of the Board's remedial orders.7"
The proposed legislation would also replace the previous director of in-
vestigation and research with the competition policy advocate. The Canadian
cabinet appoints the advocate and the deputy competition policy advocates.
The advocate's functions are essentially the same as those of the director,
75
but his quasi-judicial responsibilities include investigation of a greater num-
ber of practices that are reviewable by the Competition Board. The advocate
also has a more active role in presenting the government's position before
various administrative bodies.
76
Violation of the merger provisions of the 1975 Act would no longer be
considered a criminal offense under the proposed law. Instead of requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of detriment to the public, a burden of proof
never overcome by the Crown in contested prosecutions, the bill substitutes
the Board's review on the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. The
Board can, if the advocate meets this standard, prohibit or dissolve a merger
if it substantially lessens competition.
77
The proposed legislation also addresses the coordination of review of
mergers under the combines statute with review of mergers under the For-
eign Investment Review Act, enacted in 1974.78 To understand this portion of
the bill's provisions, one must first comprehend the details of the Foreign
Investment Review Act.
In response to public concern about the control of Canadian industries
by foreign firms, the Canadian government sponsored a study of foreign
investments. As a result of this study, Herb Gray, the minister of revenue,
wrote a report entitled Foreign Direct Investment in Canada.79 The Gray
Report, although noting the advantages of importing capital and technology,
warned against the dangers of increasing dependence on the United States.
The report recommended the establishment of a screening agency to review
the operations and investment of foreign-owned firms. The Gray Report led
the government to introduce a bill in Parliament to control foreign direct
investments and new takeovers by foreign-owned firms. Following the elec-
tion of the Trudeau government, Parliament enacted the Foreign Investment
Review Act on April 9, 1974.
In general, the FIRA provides that no foreign person or foreign enter-
prise can "take over an existing Canadian business, or... establish a new
Canadian business unrelated to any of its existing Canadian businesses,
without first receiving the approval of the government of Canada."' The
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criteria used by the cabinet to decide whether to allow a foreign takeover or
direct investment is whether the investment "is or is likely to be of significant
benefit to Canada."8' This criterion is a significant switch from that used by
the old combines laws, which disallow mergers by a foreign or domestic
acquirer only if they are "of significant detriment to the public."
Section 2(2) of the Foreign Investment Review Act enumerates five
factors the cabinet should consider in deciding whether the merger or invest-
ment is "of significant benefit to Canada." These are:
(a) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and na-
ture of economic activity in Canada, including, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource
processing, on the utilization of parts, components and services pro-
duced in Canada, and on exports from Canada;
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the
business enterprise or new business and in any industry or indus-
tries in Canada of which the business enterprise or new business
forms or would form a part;
(c) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, indus-
trial efficiency, technological development, product innovation and
product variety in Canada;
(d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within
any industry or industries in Canada; and
(e) the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national
industrial and economic policies, taking into consideration indus-
trial and economic policy objectives enunciated by the government
or legislature of any province likely to be significantly affected by
the acquisition or establishment.8 2
The FIRA also designates a procedure for choosing a minister as the
administrator of the FIRA, and establishes the Foreign Investment Review
Agency (Agency) to "advise and assist the Minister in connection with the
administration of the Act."'8 3 The agency is purely an advisory body. Deci-
sions as to whether to allow an acquisition by a foreign corporation or person
remains with the cabinet.
Section 20 of the FIRA contains provisions for enforcement. The govern-
ment can seek a court order to "render nugatory" a foreign direct investment
or acquisition contravening the act. The court can prohibit a shareholder's
exercise of voting rights, or require the divestiture of property or shares.84
Prior to the passage of FIRA, the federal and provincial governments
intervened ad hoc to prevent foreign acquisition of a greater control of Cana-
dian markets. The federal government prevented the foreign acquisition of
Denison Mines Ltd. in 1972 and the proposed foreign takeover of Home Oil
Company Ltd. in 1972. Occasionally, the provincial governments during the
early seventies took steps to prevent foreign acquisitions.
8 5
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Since the passage of FIRA, the cabinet has approved most of the pro-
posed takeovers but has rejected some undesirable acquisitions. In the first
year of FIRA's operation, the cabinet allowed thirty-six Canadian-controlled
companies to be acquired; three of these companies had assets exceeding
$5 million. The primary reason given for disallowing a merger was that it
decreased Canadian ownership without sufficient offsetting benefit to
Canada.
86
The inconvenience foreign investors suffer as a result of FIRA may deter
some acquirors. Approval by the cabinet of a proposed foreign acquisition
rarely occurs within three months of registration with the Agency. Foreign
corporations' officers must frequently attend Agency hearings and seek local
legal advice. Recently, the Agency has begun to monitor the performance of
undertakings by applicants whose investments were allowed. Naturally,
some foreign investors would prefer that the government did not scrutinize
their activities.
8 7
The federal government's commitment to opposing mergers was under-
scored by its efforts in the courts. The government secured two convictions
of corporations that violated the merger provisions of the combines law in the
cases of Regina v. Electric Reduction Co. of Canada (the ERCO case)88 and
Regina v. K. C. Irving Ltd.,89 although the decision of the trial court was later
overturned by the Supreme Court in K. C. Irving.90 Thus, the government
during the 1970s evinced a vigorous opposition to corporate concentration
caused by mergers.
The 1977 proposed legislation had attempted to coordinate the efforts of
the proposed Competition Board and the Foreign Investment Review Agency.
Under the bill, when an acquisition is referred to the Agency for clearance,
the Agency must advise the advocate of such application, after which the
advocate has fifty days to proceed against the merger in question.
9 1
The Courts' Policies During the 1970s
Although the courts have not directly ruled on the constitutionality of the
new legislation, there are indications that they would uphold the use of the
trade and commerce power to justify the establishment of federal quasi-
judicial tribunals and agencies to review the legality of mergers. Courts dur-
ing this era broadly interpreted the federal government's authority over inter-
provincial and international trade. In Burns Foods Ltd. v. Attorney General,92
the court upheld federal government direct regulation of commerce that
affected interprovincial trade. In 1972, the year before Burns Foods, Chief
Justice Jackett of the Federal Court of Appeals broadly interpreted the gen-
eral trade and commerce power to uphold federal regulation of general busi-
ness standards in Vapor Canada Ltd. v. McDonald.93
Aside from enunciating a liberal interpretation of federal powers under
the British North American Act, the lower courts have accepted federal
power to enforce the merger cases. The dispositions of Regina v. Electric
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Reduction Co. of Canada94 and Regina v. K. C. Irving Ltd. 5 indicate that the
government can win merger cases in the lower courts.
In the ERCO case, the corporate defendant pleaded guilty to a merger
charge, even though no company had ever before been convicted of a merger
offense when the charge was contested. From 1956 to 1966, ERCO was the
sole producer of industrial phosphates in Canada. In May 1959, ERCO pur-
chased Dominion Fertilizers, a new entrant into the industrial phosphate
market. ERCO also entered into reciprocal agreements with C.I.L. and Cy-
animid under which both firms agreed not to enter the industrial phosphates
market. ERCO apparently decided that the government could obtain convic-
tions for these offenses if a trial were held, and therefore pleaded guilty.
In K. C. Irving, the government convinced a trial court that a company
had violated the merger provisions of the Combines Act. K. C. Irving, over a
period of several years, acquired all five English-language dailies in New
Brunswick. Though the conviction was later overturned,9 6 the legitimacy of
the government's commitment to preventing mergers it considered illegal,
and the perceived competence of the Combines Branch attorneys, was sub-
stantially enhanced by the trial court's decision.
The two cases may also have inaugurated a new approach to remedies
for violations of the merger laws. This approach emphasizes the use of orders
of prohibition rather than fines. Although ERCO was fined a total of $30,000,
it was also subjected to an order prohibiting its anticompetitive practices.
Realizing the failure of criminal fines as remedies, the court in ERCO re-
sorted to a prohibitive order to prevent abuses likely to occur as a result of the
merger. Some commentators believe that ERCO inaugurated a new conduct-
oriented approach to the problem of corporate concentration.9 7 If this view is
correct, the courts have decided that the criminal remedies are inadequate
when applied to merger cases, and that a dissolution of the merger or a
prohibitory order preventing abuses of the merger is necessary. This view is
consistent with the trial court ruling in K. C. Irving, since the court found it
necessary to order K. C. Irving to sell both of its Mocton Papers as well as pay
a $150,000 fine.
Perhaps the most important ruling of the 1970s was that of the Canadian
Supreme Court in K. C. Irving, in which the court reinterpreted the "public
detriment" language of the merger and monopoly provisions. In a unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court concluded that, to prevail on a charge of creat-
ing an illegal merger or monopoly, the Crown must do more than show that
the accused extinguished all independent competition. Referring to cases
citing Justice Cartwright's opinion in Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd.,98 the
Canadian Supreme Court held that the Crown must also show that the
extinction of competition was, or was likely to be, to the detriment of, or
against the interest of, the public. Since there was no finding of fact support-
ing this part of the merger and monopoly offenses, the Supreme Court dis-
missed the charges.
Professor Roberts of the University of Western Ontario law faculty as-
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serts that prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in K. C. Irving, Parliament, the
Economic Council of Canada, the minister of consumer and corporate affairs,
economists, and legal scholars all regarded the public detriment elements of
the merger and monopoly provisions as relevant only to the extent of injury
to the competitive process. 99 According to Roberts, the law before K. C. Irving
contemplated just one public interest: the public interest in maintaining and
encouraging competition. A detriment to the public interest occurs when
there exists a real or threatened injury to the competitive process.
Roberts believes that the Supreme Court came to its surprising conclu-
sion because it felt that two premises of the competition laws were inconsis-
tent without the newly established rule in K. C. Irving. The merger and
monopoly provisions did not contemplate the prohibition of all monopolies.
Yet, the prime purpose of competition law is to promote competition. Logi-
cally, all monopolies fail to promote competition and should therefore be
prohibited. Because the Supreme Court could not square the two premises
without invalidating all monopolies and mergers, the Canadian Supreme
Court reinterpreted the detriment standard to conform to Justice Cartwright's
opinion and thus avoid the logical inconsistencies of the Act. 1
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Roberts labels the K. C. Irving decision a disaster to the enforcement of
merger laws, because it asks trial courts to act as economists and social
scientists. Trial courts under K. C. Irving must decide whether the merger or
monopoly constitutes an injury to the public interest and whether the injury,
if it exists, is outweighed by the social benefits of the merger or monopoly.
This would require trial judges to identify and rank countless public policies
and then derive and apply the same kind of standards as are applied to
detailed public regulation of industry. To be meaningfully applied, the crite-
ria implicit in the K. C. Irving decision require continuous supervision of
industry.101
Though Roberts is probably correct in his assessment of K. C. Irving as a
blow to the reforms of the merger laws, he overstates his argument by con-
cluding that K. C. Irving renders the merger and monopoly laws unenforce-
able. The K. C. Irving ruling would be enforceable if Parliament passed a bill
establishing a specialized tribunal capable of analyzing a merger case accord-
ing to the K. C. Irving criteria. 102 In addition, Roberts neglects to analyze the
impact of the FIRA. FIRA is not subject to the K. C. Irving decision and
could in the future constitute a major deterrent to foreign acquisitions.
THE INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
CANADIAN MERGER POLICIES: 1889-1979
The most discernible effect of Canadian merger policy has been upon the
number of foreign acquisitions. A regression analysis would provide a quanti-
tative measure of the effect of weak and strong merger policies on the num-
ber of foreign acquisitions. There are difficulties with determining the effect
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of merger policy through the use of regression analysis. It would be difficult
to subject the merger policy variable to regression analysis, since policy is a
nebulous notion. One also encounters difficulties determining when a policy
begins to become effective. Moreover, policies can be contradictory when one
branch of government pursues a course of conduct different from another.
Regressing Canadian merger policies on the number of foreign mergers
is thus difficult, though not impossible. °3 The difficulty in this process, how-
ever, does not mean that some conclusions concerning the effect of Canadian
policies are totally speculative. Policies of one branch are often consistent
with those of another. The effect of coordinated policy is easier to perceive
since one could connect a weak or strong policy to a change in the number of
foreign mergers when all branches adopt the same rather than different
policies. Moreover, observers of U.S. merger policy have generally agreed
that antitrust laws do have demonstrable effects on business activity. The
growth of conglomerates in the United States during the 1960s is often
attributed to the application of more per se rules against vertical and horizon-
tal acquisitions.'° 4 In addition, many cite the Burger Court decisions against
the government in antitrust cases as contributing to the merger boom of the
mid-1970s. 1
0 5
From 1889 to 1969, the three branches of Canadian government gener-
ally followed a consistent policy toward mergers. Thus, one need not worry
about evaluating conflicting influences of the courts, legislature, and
agencies during the early period. From an examination of the three merger-
boom periods, the effect of policy is evident. The greatest expansion of the
number of foreign mergers occurred at four times: 1900 to 1913; the 1920s;
the late 1950s to the late 1960s; and 1975 to 1978.106
In analyzing the merger booms, there is some indication that the num-
ber of foreign acquisitions in Canada depended upon the relative develop-
ment of Canadian and U.S. merger law. The early 1900s witnessed increases
in the number of total and foreign mergers in Canada, 10 7 with the British
accounting for most of the foreign acquisitions.
Apparently British investors compared the merger policy positions of the
United States and Canada and often found Canada preferable. During this
period, merger policy seems to have had an influence. The 1889 Act was still
very new and uncertain in application. Moreover, the Canadian government
brought no prosecutions against mergers and hence there was no case law
on mergers in Canada. In contrast, the United States did have an established
antitrust case law. From 1904 to 1911, the Sherman Act was interpreted as
prohibiting every contract in restraint of trade.'10 Although the Sherman Act
was not directly applied to mergers, it is conceivable that businessmen hesi-
tated to merge in the United States because courts might find the acquisition
to be in restraint of trade.
The United States did not experience a merger boom from 1900 to 1913.
During this period, the number of U.S. mergers declined significantly.' 0 9
United States and foreign businessmen contemplating a merger may have
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found Canada a safer legal environment, and this phenomenon fueled the
merger boom in Canada. It is interesting to note that the subsequent decline
in merger activity coincides with Parliament's passage of the 1910 Act, which
included mergers within the definition of combines.1 o
Merger booms occurred in both the United States and Canada during
the 1920s. During the 1920s, U.S. investment continued to erode the domi-
nance of British investment in Canada. The high correlation between U.S.
and Canadian mergers indicates that decisions to merge in Canada were
based on the economic conditions in the United States rather than merger
policies. However, Canadian law probably encouraged U.S. firms to merge
with companies in Canada. During the 1920s, Canadian antitrust law was in
a state of chaos. The temporary nullification of all merger policy by the
Canadian Supreme Court in 1921 coincides with the beginning of the
merger boom."' Americans may have perceived that new legislation on
mergers in the 1920s would take time to implement and would be similar to
the 1910 Act under which the prosecutors took no action against mergers." 1
2
Statistics reveal that the growth of foreign mergers in Canada was more
sustained than the increase in mergers in the United States during the
1960s. Canadian merger law probably appeared relatively more attractive
than U.S. acquisition law to U.S. and other foreign investors. In the United
States, the Warren Court almost always ruled against the defendant in
merger cases."' The law on mergers was far less developed in Canada than
in the United States. The Cellar-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act in
the United States strengthened the Justice Department's position against
mergers by expanding the jurisdictional reach of Section 7 .1 14 In contrast, the
1960 amendments to Canadian antitrust law ensured that corporations could
merge unmolested by Canadian regulation. Though there was much public
debate during the 1960s over the problem of transnational corporate concen-
tration, major reforms did not occur until the 1970s.
The number of foreign acquisitions in Canada grew at an unprecedented
rate from 1975 to 1978, though at a slower rate from 1977 to 1978. This
occurred in spite of a decline in the number of domestic mergers.
One can devise a number of theories explaining these trends by focusing
upon the reaction of foreign investors to the reforms of the 1970s. Perhaps
foreigners believed, as did Professor Roberts, that the Canadian Supreme
Court in 1975 announced the death of merger policy in K. C. Irving.
15
Foreign businessmen may have reasoned that Canadian criminal courts did
not have the capacity to convict a corporation of a merger offense using the
complex economic criteria specified in K. C. Irving. Moreover, the foreign
corporations may have decided that the Phase II amendments, which would
have set up machinery that could enforce the merger laws according to
economic criteria, had no chance of passage since the big business lobby in
Canada was vehemently opposed to them. According to this theory, the for-
eign corporations decided that they could take over Canadian firms without
molestation from government authorities.
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The above theory ignores the effect of the FIRA on the decision making
of foreign corporations. Professor Douglas F. Lamont demonstrates that the
anticipation of FIRA and ad hoc intervention of the Crown and provincial
governments to prevent foreign acquisitions led to a decline in foreign
investment. " 6 The decline of foreign mergers in Canada in the early 1970s is
consistent with a theory that the first year of FIRA and the ad hoc interven-
tion of Canadian governments induced foreign corporations to look else-
where. Professor Lamont asserts that U.S. firms from 1970 to 1973 did not
choose Canadian firms for acquisitions because of radical change in the
investment climate. During this three-year period, the U.S. share of total
foreign investment in Canada decreased from 82 percent to 78 percent."7
The Germans apparently perceived in like manner the new Canadian atti-
tudes toward foreign investment. From 1970 to 1973, the percentage of total
foreign investment decreased from 36 percent to 34 percent."' According to
Lamont, the rate of increase in U.S. foreign investment in Canada slowed
during the early 1970s because U.S. corporations decided better opportuni-
ties could be found elsewhere.'
9
It was possible that the impact of FIRA would lead to less foreign invest-
ment. Certainly the power granted the cabinet under the FIRA could have
provided a deterrent to foreign investment. However, the increase in the
number of foreign mergers in Canada during the late 1970s indicates that
foreign investment via acquisition did not decrease. This phenomenon can-
not be explained by comparison with the state of U.S. merger law. The
Burger Court during this period almost inevitably held for the defendant in
antitrust cases.' 2" Firms would probably find the United States a more con-
ducive legal environment for mergers, at least with respect to conglomerate
mergers.
There are a number of theories which could explain the recent increase in
foreign acquisitions. Foreign corporations may have developed expertise in
dealing with the FIRA. In anticipation of FIRA, multinational corporations
may have reduced their acquisitions for fear that obtaining government appro-
val would be difficult and costly. As soon as it was clear that the Foreign
Investment Review Agency would approve the majority of applications for
acquisitions, foreign firms may have decided to apply for as many acquisitions
as possible before the Agency became more suspect of foreign takeovers.
A contributing factor to the increase in foreign acquisitions may have
been that many of these acquisitions were in service industries outside the
jurisdiction of the Agency. The legislature apparently was of the belief that
the national interest was threatened less by foreign acquisitions outside the
manufacturing and resource industries; moreover, such acquisitions usually
involved a small amount of assets. This attitude reflects a Canadian sensitiv-
ity to foreign takeover of their natural resources.'
2 '
Moreover, since coal and rubber industries were already heavily concen-
trated in foreign hands, 22 much of the foreign investment in the 1970s
occurred in other areas. In addition, during the 1970s the Agency demon-
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Table 1.
Percentage Distribution of Types of Mergers, Canada and the United States'
24
Percentage of Total Mergers
Country Type of Merger 1945-61 1972 1973 1974






Vertical 22.43 12.3 12.5 9.2
Conglomerate 9.31 18.8 18.6 23.1
United States 1948-63





Vertical 19.89 17.2 11.0 4.8
Conglomerate 12.74 24.1 32.8 32.3
strated a tendency to allow foreign mergers which did not involve a great deal
of assets.12
Another radical change that occurred in Canada during the 1970s was
an increase in the number of conglomerate acquisitions. Table 1 shows the
changes in percentages distribution of types of mergers in Canada and the
United States.
From table 1, it is apparent that the percentage of broad horizontal
mergers has not changed in Canada from the immediate postwar years
through the early 1970s. Meanwhile, broad horizontal mergers have declined
over the same period in the United States. One of the reasons for the decline
in U.S. horizontal mergers is the Supreme Court's application of more strin-
gent rules of illegality to horizontal and vertical mergers. 125 In Canada, the
courts did not develop any per se rule against horizontal mergers. Thus,
Canada became a safe area for merging with a competitor, and the steady
percentage of horizontal mergers throughout these years is not surprising.
In both the U.S. and Canada, vertical mergers decreased throughout the
1970s. The decrease in the United States can be attributed to the per se rules
of illegality applied by the Supreme Court to many vertical acquisitions. The
decrease in the Canadian percentage may be attributable to the exhaustion of
foreign investment opportunities in the mining and natural resource indus-
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tries. In the earlier period, foreign interests sought control of the natural
resources of the industry. By the 1970s foreign manufacturers may have
exploited all the possibilities of gaining control of Canada's natural resources
and may have sought to expand their markets by merging with a firm in an
unrelated industry.
At the same time, FIRA and ad hoc government interaction may have
reduced the number of vertical mergers. Foreign manufacturers arguably
desire to gain control of the natural resources necessary for the production of
their products. If the foreign manufacturers could not merge vertically in
their own countries, Canada would be a logical alternative location for such a
merger during the immediate postwar era, since the Canadian government
was not prohibiting such acquisitions. This theory accounts for the high
percentage of vertical mergers from 1945 to 1961. The change in the govern-
ment's attitude toward foreign acquisitions of natural resources may have
triggered a drop in the percentage of vertical mergers during the 1970s.
Finally, conglomerate mergers have been on the rise in both countries. A
contributing reason for the increase in percentage of conglomerate mergers
in the United States could be that the Supreme Court has not been able to
apply traditional market acquisition analysis to conglomerate acquisitions.
26
Merger policy may also have contributed to the rise in conglomerates in
Canada. There is no Canadian case law on conglomerate mergers. Further-
more, it is very difficult to prove a lessening of competition from a conglomer-
ate merger. Conglomerate mergers do not alter the number of firms in an
industry. One must therefore resort to theories of potential competition to
prove a violation. Since Canadian courts have not enunciated a potential
competition theory, proof of a violation of the law as a result of a conglomer-
ate merger is exceedingly difficult. This difficulty may have contributed to
the increase in the number of foreign conglomerates in Canada.
Aside from altering the number and type of foreign acquisitions in Can-
ada, merger policy or lack of it has not impeded foreign ownership of Cana-
dian industries. As a result of mergers and direct investments, foreign inter-
ests in Canada own 95.5 percent of petroleum and coal industries; 93.1
percent of rubber products; 86 percent of the transportation equipment in-
cluding automobiles; 84 percent of tobacco products; 81 percent of the
chemicals industry; and over 50 percent of the machinery and electrical
industries.'2 7 Despite reforms, the merger laws have not prevented this high
level of foreign ownership. Such ownership has several important impacts.
Many Canadians of the 1970s view U.S. control as detrimental to their
international trade. Many argue that multinational firms use factors of pro-
duction that are extrememly mobile; such firms would therefore not make
decisions solely on the grounds of the most efficient use of Canadian
resources. 2 8 Canadian observers emphasize that foreign firms are ethnocen-
tric and that the host country will tend to end up with fewer economic
benefits from the foreign investor. The net result of concentration of indus-
trial control in foreign hands is seen as a less favorable trade balance and
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fewer collateral benefits such as research and development and management
training.129
This line of argument is not unassailable. Much of Canada's production
must be exported because the home country itself consumes less than half of
its products. Canada exports over 50 percent of the goods it produces,
whereas large industrial countries consume 80-85 percent of their domestic
production.' 3 Furthermore, Canada benefits from exposure to the more so-
phisticated techniques of research and development and management train-
ing practiced by some large U.S. firms.
Even if Canadians have a less than fully realistic view of the impact of
transnational corporate concentration, their perceptions may be the most
important result of such concentration. Canadian scholars have written many
volumes concerning their fears of domination by such U.S. firms as Exxon
and General Motors.'31 Some fear the rejuvenation of the discredited conti-
nental thesis, which asserts that Canada and the United States will merge
their respective economies to form one North American market.'
32
These fears can be explained by the recent increase in foreign acquisi-
tions and control of markets. During the 1950s and 1960s, Canadians openly
admired the United States, and some called for continentalism. 33 However,
throughout the 1970s Canadians became disillusioned with the U.S. pres-
ence. Opposition to U.S. investment in Canada was directly correlated with
U.S. control of Canadian industry.'
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Since high foreign investment and acquisition led to discontent among
the more densely populated provinces, the federal government became con-
vinced that something had to be done to counter the economic power of U.S.
finns in Canada. This conviction led to the passage of FIRA and to various
investments undertaken by the government of Canada to prevent foreign
acquisitions. 135 Discontent in areas like Ontario led to several investments by
provincial governments to counter U.S. acquisitions of Canadian firms.'
36
Because of foreign domination, Canada's economy is subject to some
extent to changes in the economies of other countries. On the other hand,
Canada benefits in several ways from U.S. domination of industry, such as
the advantages of economies of scale achieved by big U.S. firms and cultural
exchanges inherent in transnational investment.
PROBABLE FUTURE CHANGES IN CANADA'S MERGER POLICY
AND THEIR EFFECTS
Canadian merger law in the 1980s will in all probability be more aggressive
than in the past toward preventing foreign acquisitions. Parliament is un-
likely to pass all of what was contained in the proposed 1977 legislation
because of the intense business lobby against any regulation of mergers.
However, some form of civil legislation dealing with mergers will probably
emerge. The government now realizes that application of criminal law to
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merger violations is inappropriate, particularly in light of the unrealistic stan-
dards of review imposed upon criminal courts by K. C. Irving. Furthermore,
Parliament should feel confident of its constitutional authority to enact such
provisions since recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded the federal
government's general trade and commerce power.
The federal government in the 1980s will probably seek to enforce anti-
merger laws more vigorously, especially against foreign firms. Even if Parlia-
ment makes no changes in the merger law, the government has the power
under FIRA to prevent most foreign acquisitions. Since nationalism is grow-
ing within Canada, the government may feel political pressure to demon-
strate its opposition to U.S. domination of Canada's industries, particularly if
the increase in foreign acquisitions continues. The government also seems
convinced that foreign control of key industries must be curtailed in order to
promote economic efficiency.
The courts are probably the only branch of government in Canada that
will lack vigor in their policy against mergers in the 1980s. As K.C. Irving
demonstrated, the Supreme Court is not overly concerned with ensuring that
the merger laws are efficiently enforced, because it established standards of
review for mergers which could not possibly be applied by lower courts.
However, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court, using the recent expansive
interpretations of federal powers, would declare a civil law covering mergers
unconstitutional.
If Canada does institute a more vigorous policy against foreign acquisi-
tions, the overall number of foreign mergers should decline. But assuming
that foreign investors maintain interest in the Canadian market, the number
of foreign conglomerate mergers should increase, since foreign corporations
would perceive that the Crown has the greatest difficulty proving a lessening
of competition in cases involving conglomerate acquisitions. The percentage
of horizontal mergers should remain about the same unless the Canadian
courts or quasi-judicial tribunals develop per se rules against such mergers,
and foreign vertical mergers will probably decline because Canadians fear
the control of their natural resources by foreign manufacturers and are likely
to enforce vigorously their antitrust laws in this area.
The decline in the level of foreign investment may ultimately lead to a
demand for reform of the merger laws to encourage such investment. As
stated above, the rise of nationalism and opposition to foreign investment is
directly related to the amount of foreign investment. If vigorous merger laws
result in a drastic reduction in foreign investment, antagonism toward such
investment will wane considerably. Foreign investment in urban areas may
become as negligible as it is in rural areas of Canada. In areas of low foreign
investment, the people and laws favor foreign investment in order to stimu-
late their local economy. Eventually, the Canadian populace in urban areas
will demand that greater foreign investment be allowed. Thus, ironically,
vigorous foreign merger laws may ultimately lead to a call for merger policies
favoring foreign investment and acquisitions.
194 - Foreign Approaches
NOTES
1. Canada's Merger Muddle, 270
ECONOMIST 80 (1979).
2. Id.
3. In the late nineteenth century, the
populist and Granger movement in
the United States agitated for pub-
lic control over price-fixing, railroad
rebates, and other harmful business
practices. In response, Congress
created the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1887 to control rail-
road power and the Sherman Act in
1890 to condemn trade restraints
and monopolies. Some observers as-
sert that Congress passed the origi-
nal antitrust statutes only to ap-
pease the reform movement, and
therefore purposely left the Sher-
man Act vague and seemingly in-
nocuous to please powerful busi-
ness interests. See P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 43-44 (2d
ed., 1974) (discussing the political
background of the Sherman Act).
4. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, CORPORATE
CRIME IN CANADA: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF ANTI-COMBINES
LEGISLATION 42 (1978).
5. Id. at 43.
6. L. REYNOLDS, THE CONTROL OF
COMPETITION IN CANADA 132-33
(1940).
7. For example, an effort was made to
weaken Wallace's bill by deleting
the provision that a combines con-
viction would result in a corpora-
tion losing its charter. Wallace as-
serted that these changes were the
result of"... those men who have
formed those illegal combinations
and who came down ... with a
great array of lawyers from Mon-
treal and Toronto and with amend-
ments carefully considered, to legis-
late the bill out of existence." H. C.
DEB. 1889, quoted in L. REYNOLDS,
supra note 6, at 134 n. 5.
8. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 45. The Act, S. C. 1889, as
finally enacted, read:
1. Every person who conspires,
combines, agrees or arranges
with any other person, or with
any railway, steamship, steam-
boat, or transportation com-
pany, unlawfully,
(a) To unduly limit the facilities
for transporting, producing,
manufacturing, supplying, stor-
ing or dealing in any article or
commodity which may be a sub-
ject of trade or commerce; or-
(b) To restrain or injure trade
or commerce in relation to any
such article or commodity; or-
(c) To unduly prevent, limit, or
lessen the manufacture or pro-
duction of any such article or
commodity, or to unreasonably
enhance the price thereof; or-
(d) To unduly prevent or lessen
competition in the production,
manufacture, purchase, barter,
sale, transportation or supply of
any such article or commodity,
or in the price of insurance
upon person or property;
Is guilty of a misdemeanor and
liable, on conviction, to a penalty
not exceeding four thousand dol-
lars and not less than two hun-
dred dollars, or to imprisonment
for any term not exceeding two
years; and ifa corporation, is li-
able on conviction to a penalty
not exceeding ten thousand dol-
lars and not less than one thou-
sand dollars. [Emphasis added.1
An Act for the Protection and Sup-
pression of Combinations Formed
in Restraint of Trade, Can. Stat. c.
41 § 1 (1899).
9. See text accompanying notes 45-51
infra which discuss the constitu-
tional issues raised by Canada's
competition laws. This is in sharp
contrast to American antitrust stat-
utes which provide both civil and
criminal penalties.
10. See Bertrand, The Combines Inves-
tigation Act, 44 ANTITRUST L.J.
465, 467 (1975).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
12. Despite all of the 1889 Act's pit-
falls, it did enunciate a statutory
philosophy of free competition. One
might have hypothesized that Par-
liament would develop more vigor-
ous provisions over the course of
eighty years. However, the true re-
forms have come only very recently
in the history of Canadian merger
legislation.
13. Can. Star. c. 41 § 3 (1889).
14. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 105.
15. The substantive provisions of the
1910 Combines Act were similar to
those of the 1889 Act.
16. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 53-55.




18. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 105.
19. Can. Stat. c. 1 (1919).
20. In Re the Board of Commerce Act,
1919 and the Combines and Fair
Prices Act 1919 [19221 A.C. 191
(P.C. 1921) (Can.). See also R.
GROSSE, THE LAW ON COMPETITION
IN CANADA 226 n. 2 (1962).
21. The Combines Investigation Act
1923, Can. Stat. c. 9 (1923).
22. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 59.
23. The Dominion Trade and Industry
Act, Can. Stat. c. 9 (1935).
24. See Roberts, The Death of Competi-
tion Policy: Monopoly, Merger and
Regina v. K. C. Irving Ltd., 16
Canadian Merger Policy - 195
U.W. ONT. L. REV. 215 (1977) and
text accompanying notes 99-101
infra.
25. Can. Stat. c. 54 § 2(1)(F) (1935).
26. See text accompanying notes 99-
101 infra.
27. Annual Report of Proceedings
under the Combines Investigation
Act 3 (1947) quoted in G.
ROSENBLUTH & H. THORBURN, SU-
pra note 17, at 7.
28. See G. ROSENBLUTH & H.
THORBURN, supra note 17, at 6.
29. Id.
30. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 105.
31. See G. ROSENBLUTH & H.
THORBURN, supra note 17, at 7.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 8.
34. Id. at 17-26.
35. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 70; see also Quinland, The
RTPC: Its Function and Duties, 44
ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 492 (1975).
36. This process begins when a com-
bines investigation officer conducts
the preliminary investigation into
an alleged merger or other antitrust
violation. If the officer finds con-
flicting or inconclusive evidence,
the director usually drops the mat-
ter. If the director decides to contin-
ue the investigation, he is ordinarily
reasonably confident that the law is
being broken. The director has au-
thority to search the records of a
company without prior notice, to re-
quire the officers of a corporation to
testify, and to subpoena a com-
pany's records. Unless the director
reaches the stage of taking the tes-
timony of corporate officers, he may
drop his investigation without refer-
ence to the RTPC. C. GOFF & C.
REASONS, supra note 4, at 33-37;
see also Quinlan, supra note 35.
If the Director continues, he will
submit to the RTPC a statement of
196 - Foreign Approaches
evidence explaining the nature of
the industry investigated, as well as
the director's allegations and sup-
porting evidence. In an in camera
proceeding before the RTPC, com-
bines officers usually represent the
director, while lawyers present the
firm's position. After the evidence is
presented, the director states his
conclusions, the opposing counsel
replies, and the director then has a
chance for rebuttal. Use of empiri-
cal economic as well as legal evi-
dence is permitted.
The RTPC's Report to the Minis-
ter describes the industry involved,
the events leading up to the direc-
tor's allegations and the remedies
deemed advisable. Normally, the re-
port will give no advice as to
whether prosecutions are neces-
sary. G. ROSENBLUTH & H.
THORBURN, supra note 17, at 38.
37. This standard is comparable to the
American "incipiency test" found in
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §18 (1976), which prohibits
acquistions or mergers whose ef-
fects "may be substantially to les-
sen competition .. " Arguably, the
Canadian amendments could be in-
terpreted more broadly than the
Clayton Act since, under Canadian
law, even the likelihood of events
leading to an offense can result in
remedial enforcement action.
38. Prior to 1952, no reports had been
issued concerning charges of illegal
mergers. C. GOFF & C. REASONS,
supra note 4, at 94-97.
39. G. ROSENBLUTH & H. THORBURN,
supra note 17, at 40.
40. Id. at 93. By separating mergers
and monopolies from the rest of the
act, Parliament effectively confined
the reform efforts to anticompetitive
practices other than monopolies
and mergers. The 1960 amend-
ments specified that disputes over
the existence of combines offenses
other than mergers and monopolies
are confined to proof of the effect of
such practices on competition. Par-
liament made no such specification
in the merger and monopoly provi-
sions and thus allowed the Cana-
dian Supreme Court in Regina v.
K. C. Irving Ltd., 72 D.L.R.3d 82
(1976), to hold that defendants
could introduce evidence of the ef-
fect of an anticompetitive merger
and monopoly on the public inter-
est such as increasing returns to
scale or efficiency.
41. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 98.
42. Id. at 99.
43. See Borgsdorf, Virtually Uncon-
strained Legal Environment for
Mergers in Canada, 18 ANTITRUST
BULL. 809 (1973); Canada's
Merger Muddle, supra note 1.
44. See C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra
note 4, at 97-100.
45. The British North American Act,
1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3.
46. See Bertrand, supra note 10, at
466.
47. Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada
v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96 (1881).
48. [19221 A.C. 191 (P.C. 1921) (Can.).
49. [19351 A.C. 76 (P.C. 1934) (Can.).
50. 32 D.L.R.2d 641, 658 (1962).
51. See notes 45-46 and accompanying
text supra for an explication of Can-
ada's constitution; see also Hart-
field, The Constitutionality of Can-
ada's New Competition Law, 26 U.
NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 3 (1977).
52. 61 C.C.C. 114 (1933).
53. 4 D.L.R. 699 (1940).-
54. [1952] 13 C.R. 217 (Que. Ct. K.B.
1951) aff'd. 18 Crim. 357 (1954)
(Que. Ct. K.B. App. Side 1953).
55. [19601 O.R. 601.
56. Professor Borgsdorf believed that by
requiring proof of monopolistic con-
ditions to convict a corporation of a
merger offense the Canadian courts
in effect eliminated the merger pro-
vision of the Combines Act. Accord-
ing to Borgsdorf, a government in-
tent upon prosecuting a merger of-
fense had to examine whether the
monopoly provisions of the Com-
bines Act had been violated. If the
government could not prove the de-
fendant had violated any provision
related to monopoly, then it could
not gain a conviction for a merger
offense. Borgsdorf, supra note 43.
57. Weidman v. Shragge, 46 S.C.R. 1,
4 (1912).
58. 119421 S.C.R. 147, 151.
59. [19581 29 C.P.R. 6 (S.C.C.).
60. Professor R. J. Roberts labels Jus-
tice Cartwright's position as unreal-
istic because it attempts to convert
judges into economists. Judges do
not have the expertise to analyze
whether anticompetitive acts harm
the public interest more than the
alleged beneficial economic conse-
quences of such acts promote the
public interest. Roberts points out
that, to be truly workable, Justice
Cartwright's position would require
establishing a public agency with
extensive regulatory power over in-
dustries to ensure that the public
interest is truly promoted by an an-
ticompetitive merger or other act.
Parliament specifically rejected
public regulation of industry in the
1889 Act, and thus the Justice's po-
sition is inconsistent with Parlia-
ment's original intent. Roberts, su-
pra note 24, at 219-20.
61. Id. at 221; see Combines Investiga-
tion Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 23 § §
2, 33 (1970).
62. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 221-
26.
63. See text accompanying notes 3-44
supra for an explanation of pre-
1970 amendments to the merger
laws.
Canadian Merger Policy - 197
64. See C. FLAVELL, CANADIAN
COMPETITION LAW: A BUSINESS
GUIDE 6 (1979).
65. Id. at 6-8.
66. Id. at 7.
67. Id. at 8.
68. See text accompanying notes 92-95
infra for a discussion of recent con-
stitutional holdings of Canadian
courts.
69. C-256, 28th Parliament, 3d Sess.
(1970-71).
70. The Combines Investigation Act,
Can. Stat. c. 76 (1975) (amending
CAN. REV. STAT. c. 23 (1970)).
71. Id. at § 12 (amending CAN. REV.
STAT. c. 23 § 31.1 (1) (1970).
72. Realizing the possibility of contro-
versy concerning the proposals, the
government commissioned a group
of nongovernment experts to gain
support for their position. The rec-
ommendations of the government-
sponsored Skeoch-McDonald Re-
port were similar to those of the
Economic Council. The new report
recommended a case-by-case ap-
proach to mergers. Not having to
conform to criminal procedures, the
tribunal in the Skeoch-McDonald
conception would have great flexi-
bility in choosing decisional criteria
for each case. The report left the
impression that certain mergers
should be encouraged.
The government first presented
the Stage II amendments to Parlia-
ment as Bill C-42 on March 16,
1977. This bill received consider-
able criticism in the Senate and
had to be withdrawn. The govern-
ment then resubmitted the amend-
ments as Bill C-13 on November
18, 1977, without substantial
change from the provisions of Bill
C-42. L. SKEOCH, DYNAMIC
CHANGE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN A
CANADIAN MARKET ECONOMY
(1976).
198 • Foreign Approaches
73. C. FLAVELL, supra note 64, at 12.
74. C. 13, 30th Parliament, 3d Sess. §§
34, 41 (1977).
75. Id. at § 6.
76. Id.
77. Id. at § 29. A merger is defined
broadly as "any acquisition or es-
tablishment by one or more per-
sons.., of any control over or in-
terest in the whole or any part of
the business of a competitor ..
Id. A joint venture is included
within the definition of a merger if
it is effected by the creation of a
new corporation.
The provisions of the proposed
law are applicable to all conglomer-
ate and vertical mergers. Horizontal
mergers are subject to review only
if they result in control of more
than 20 percent of the market.
Subsection 4 of the proposed Sec-
tion 31.71 specifies the factors that
the Board should use in analyzing a
merger case. The most important of
these are:
(1) the size differential between the
businesses of the parties to the
merger and those remaining;
(2) the barriers to entry into the
market in question and the effect
the merger might have on them;
(3) any history of growth by
merger by any party to the merger;
(4) any history of anticompetitive
behavior by any party;
(5) any likelihood of removal of a
vigorous or effective competitor;
and
(6) any likelihood that a firm is
about to fail or has failed. [Id.]
The use of "any" in many of these
factors indicates that the Board can
even consider marginal factors.
The companies involved could
also defend the propriety of their
merger on grounds of an increase
in efficiency of the Canadian econ-
omy. If the Board is satisfied that a
merger brought about or will proba-
bly bring about a substantial in-
crease in efficiency through savings
of resources, it cannot issue an
order. However, even where the
merger generates efficiency gains,
the Board must rule against the
merger if it would reduce the rele-
vant market to a virtual monopoly.
Id.
78. Id.; see Foreign Investment Review
Act, Can. Stat. c. 46 (1973).
79. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA
(1972).
80. Spence, The Foreign Investment
Review Act of Canada, 4 SYR. J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 303, 308 (1977).
81. Can. Stat. c. 46 § 2(2) (1973).
82. Id.; Spence, supra note 80, at 308-9.
83. Can. Stat. c. 46 §§ 3, 7(1) (1973).
84. Id.
85. Donaldson & Jackson, The Foreign
Investment Review Act 53 CAN.
BAR REV. 171, 175 (1975).
86. See Spence, supra note 80, at 312-
14, quoting [1974-751 FOREIGN
INVESTMENT REV. AGENCY ANN.
REPORT (1975).
87. Id. at 309-11.
88. 61 C.P.R. 235 (1970).
89. 16 C.C.C.2d 49; 45 D.L.R.3d 45
(1974).
90. 72 D.L.R.3d 82 (1976); see text
accompanying notes 94-102 infra
for an analysis of ERCO and K. C.
Irving.
91. C. FLAVELL, supra note 64, at 395.
92. [1974] 40 D.L.R.3d 731, 737
(1973).
93. [19731 33 C.L.R.3d 434 (Fed. Ct.
App. 1972); see Bertrand, supra
note 10, at 468-69.
94. 61 C.P.R. 235 (1970).
95. 16 C.C.C.2d 49; 45 D.L.R.3d 45
(1974).
96. 72 D.L.R.3d 82 (1976).
97. McFetridge, The Emergence of a
Canadian Merger Policy: The
ERCO Case, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 1
(1974).
98. 29 C.P.R. (S.C.C.) (1958); see text
accompanying notes 59-62 supra
for an analysis of Justice Cart-
wright's opinion in Howard Smith
Paper Mills.
99. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 222.
100. Id at 223.
101. Id. at 226.
102. See text accompanying notes 74-78
supra.
103. Such a regression could be per-
formed by using dummy variables.
One could set the years in which
more effective policies were insti-
tuted equal to one and those years in
which no or ineffective policies were
instituted equal to zero. Various vari-
ables, such as fluctuations in stock
market prices, could be controlled
for. Also, certain adjustments could
be made to account for lag time be-
tween passage of legislation and in-
stitution of the policy. Thus, the re-
gression of the dummy and control
variables on the number of foreign
mergers would generate a crude
measure of the effect of merger poli-
cies on U.S. and other foreign
merger activity in Canada.
104. In his concurring opinion in the
case of FTC v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967), jus-
tice Harlan emphasized that the
rules that have evolved in connec-
tion with mergers of the horizontal
or vertical varieties are often not
appropriate when applied to market
extension and conglomerate
mergers. He suggested that the
courts should attempt to formulate
separate standards for judging the
legality of conglomerates, rather
than applying the more mechanical
per se rules used in horizontal and
vertical cases. [Emphasis added.]
105. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 227-32
Canadian Merger Policy • 199
(1976) (contrasting the Supreme
Court of the 1960s that "wrote anti-
trust enforcement virtually a blank
check" with today's Supreme Court
which is more conservative in anti-
trust cases).
106. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 104.
107. For these early years statistics did
not divide mergers into domestic
and foreign categories, but the
number of foreign mergers is prob-
ably highly correlated with the
number of total mergers in Canada.
108. In 1911, Chief Justice White, in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 60, 65 (1911), first ap-
plied a "rule of reason" construc-
tion to Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The standard is further dis-
cussed in United States v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,
179 (1911).
109. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE: BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970 PART 2, 914 (1976).
110. C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra note
4, at 104.
111. See text accompanying note 20,
supra.
112. See C. GOFF & C. REASONS, supra
note 4, at 104.
113. See R. POSNER, supra note 105.
114. Anti-Merger Act of 1950, Pub. L.
No. 81-1184, § 64 Stat. 1125
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
115. See Roberts, supra note 24.
116. Lamont, Emerging Neo-Mercantil-
ism in Canadian Policy Toward
State Enterprises and Foreign Di-
rect Investment, 8 VAND. J. OF





120. See R. POSNER, supra note 105.
200 - Foreign Approaches
121. See Lamont, supra note 116.
122. See Dickey, The Americanization
Syndrome in United States-Cana-
dian Relations, 6 CAS. W. RES. J.
OF INT'L LAW 82, 85-86 (1973).
123. See Spence, supra note 80.
124. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CORPORATE
CONCENTRATION, REPORT ON
CORPORATE CONCENTRATION 147.
125. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
126. Id.
127. Dickey, supra note 122, at 84.
128. Hudec, Possible Trade Conse-
quences of Canadian Foreign In-
vestment Policy, 6 CAS. W. RES. J.
OF INT'L LAW 74, 75 (1973).
129. Id. at 74-75.
130. Coutts, Factors Influencing Cana-
dian-American Trade: A Canadian
View, 6 CAS. W. RES. J. OF INT'L
LAW 56, 58 (1973).
131. Lamont, supra note 116, at 121.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 122.
134. Citizens are most discontented With
U.S. investment and most national-
istic in Ontario and other urban
centers, the heartland of U.S. in-
vestment. In contrast, Canadians in
the Atlantic and Prairie provinces,
where American investment is low,
welcome foreign acquisitions and
tend to be less nationalistic. Dickey,
supra note 122, at 86-87.
135. See Lamont, supra note 116.
136. Id. There are several other conse-
quences of the foreign corporate
presence in Canada which exceed
the scope of this study. One of the
more important of these conse-
quences is the extraterritorial ap-
plication of foreign laws to much
of Canadian industry. The United
States and the EEC assert that
their antitrust laws apply to their
corporations in Canada so long as
the effect of the U.S. or European
company's transaction in Canada
affects competition in the United
States or Europe, respectively.
United States tax and other corpo-
rate laws apply to U.S. firms in-
vesting in Canada. Canada has at-
tempted to legislate against the ex-
traterritorial application of such
laws but the validity of the Cana-
dian Legislation is in doubt.
Sutherland, Rio-Tinto Zinc Corpo-
ration v. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation: Extra-territorial
Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters,
5 MONASH L. REV. 76
(1978).
